Workshop #1 - Leeds (January 2016)
This event was the first in a series of 4 planned workshops being held by the European Non-Categorical Thinking Project. (See external page)
PROGRAMME
Tuesday 19th January
09:30 – 11:00 Session 1
John Divers (University of Leeds, Centre for Metaphysics and Mind)
Some Thoughts About Non-Categorical Thoughts
11.30 – 13:00 Session 2
Karolina Krzyzanowska (Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Centre for Mathematical Philosophy)
What Are Indicative Conditionals About?
14:00 – 15:30 Session 3
Dominic Gregory (University of Sheffield)
Suppositional Reasoning and Modal Knowledge
Abstract:
We very often reason from suppositions when engaged in counterfactual thought. But how far can suppositional reasoning help us to arrive at knowledge of what is (metaphysically) necessary or possible? Williamson has argued that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity, partly on account of various putative logical equivalences relating counterfactual claims and ones featuring the metaphysical modalities. I will argue that, while Williamson's claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has failed to provide any reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. I will also explore another path to ascriptions of possibility that may be extracted from Williamson's ideas, before briefly pondering the general status of counterfactual reasoning in relation to our knowledge of possibilities.
16:00 – 17:30 Session 4
Daniel Elstein (University of Leeds, Centre for Metaphysics and Mind))
Antirealism About Non-Categorical Thinking
Wednesday 20th January
09:30 – 11:00 Session 5
Andrea Iacona (University of Turin, Centre for Logic Language and Cognition)
Conditionals and Negation
11:30 – 13:00 Session 6
Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin, Centre for Logic Language and Cognition)
A Logic of Inductive Conditionals: Why We Need it and How to Get it.
Abstract:
The if… then… construction of conditional statements is plausibly a logical universal across human languages (Comrie 1986). Conditionals support crucial patterns of non-categorical thinking involving possible states of affairs that are imagined, presupposed, or conjectured yet not known as a matter of fact. Traditionally, the large amount of puzzlement and disagreement that conditionals have raised is commonplace. A growing consensus now relies on probabilistic approaches (Oaksford and Chater 2010) to overcome earlier divergences between so-called material conditional of classical propositional logic and behavioural evidence (in both language use and experimental observation). However, this emerging perspective is already facing serious theoretical and empirical challenges (Douven 2015; Iacona 2015; Krzyżanowska et al. 2013). I will suggest that current logical theories represent an essentially inadequate yardstick to interpret observed reasoning and judgment concerning conditionals. The characterization of a new kind of non-material conditional, here tentatively labelled inductive, is in order – or so I will argue. In an inductive conditional, the antecedent is meant to inductively support and indeed partially entail the consequent. Although straightforward ("if there’s smoke, then there’s fire"), this use of the conditional eludes prevailing accounts, including Adams’s (1975) celebrated logic of the suppositional conditional. I will then outline how the combination of Crupi and Tentori’s (2013) axiomatic analysis of partial entailment and Adams’s (1975) techniques could generate a logical system integrating the standard material conditional with two distinct kinds of non-material conditional — suppositional and inductive — in one and the same formal language with a unified semantics.
REFERENCES
Adams E.W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Comrie B. (1986). Conditionals: A typology. In E.C. Traugott, A. Meulen, J.S. Reilly, and C.A. Ferguson (eds.), On Conditionals (pp. 77-99). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crupi V. and Tentori K. (2013). Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 11: 364-372 [Erratum in Journal of Applied Logic, 12 (2014): 230-231].
Douven I. (2015). The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals: Formal and Empirical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iacona A. (2015). Conditionals and negation. Manuscript.
Krzyżanowska K., Wenmackers S., and Douven I. (2013). Inferential conditionals and evidentiality. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 22: 315-334.
Oaksford M. and Chater N. (eds.) (2010). Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
FURTHER WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
Thomas Brouwer
Sam Careelmont
Jade Fletcher
Simon Hewitt
Gail Leckie
Joseph Melia
John Parry
Adam Patel-Summers
Mathieu Rees
Scott Shalkowski
Robbie Williams
Tuesday 19th January
09:30 – 11:00 Session 1
John Divers (University of Leeds, Centre for Metaphysics and Mind)
Some Thoughts About Non-Categorical Thoughts
11.30 – 13:00 Session 2
Karolina Krzyzanowska (Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Centre for Mathematical Philosophy)
What Are Indicative Conditionals About?
14:00 – 15:30 Session 3
Dominic Gregory (University of Sheffield)
Suppositional Reasoning and Modal Knowledge
Abstract:
We very often reason from suppositions when engaged in counterfactual thought. But how far can suppositional reasoning help us to arrive at knowledge of what is (metaphysically) necessary or possible? Williamson has argued that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity, partly on account of various putative logical equivalences relating counterfactual claims and ones featuring the metaphysical modalities. I will argue that, while Williamson's claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has failed to provide any reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. I will also explore another path to ascriptions of possibility that may be extracted from Williamson's ideas, before briefly pondering the general status of counterfactual reasoning in relation to our knowledge of possibilities.
16:00 – 17:30 Session 4
Daniel Elstein (University of Leeds, Centre for Metaphysics and Mind))
Antirealism About Non-Categorical Thinking
Wednesday 20th January
09:30 – 11:00 Session 5
Andrea Iacona (University of Turin, Centre for Logic Language and Cognition)
Conditionals and Negation
11:30 – 13:00 Session 6
Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin, Centre for Logic Language and Cognition)
A Logic of Inductive Conditionals: Why We Need it and How to Get it.
Abstract:
The if… then… construction of conditional statements is plausibly a logical universal across human languages (Comrie 1986). Conditionals support crucial patterns of non-categorical thinking involving possible states of affairs that are imagined, presupposed, or conjectured yet not known as a matter of fact. Traditionally, the large amount of puzzlement and disagreement that conditionals have raised is commonplace. A growing consensus now relies on probabilistic approaches (Oaksford and Chater 2010) to overcome earlier divergences between so-called material conditional of classical propositional logic and behavioural evidence (in both language use and experimental observation). However, this emerging perspective is already facing serious theoretical and empirical challenges (Douven 2015; Iacona 2015; Krzyżanowska et al. 2013). I will suggest that current logical theories represent an essentially inadequate yardstick to interpret observed reasoning and judgment concerning conditionals. The characterization of a new kind of non-material conditional, here tentatively labelled inductive, is in order – or so I will argue. In an inductive conditional, the antecedent is meant to inductively support and indeed partially entail the consequent. Although straightforward ("if there’s smoke, then there’s fire"), this use of the conditional eludes prevailing accounts, including Adams’s (1975) celebrated logic of the suppositional conditional. I will then outline how the combination of Crupi and Tentori’s (2013) axiomatic analysis of partial entailment and Adams’s (1975) techniques could generate a logical system integrating the standard material conditional with two distinct kinds of non-material conditional — suppositional and inductive — in one and the same formal language with a unified semantics.
REFERENCES
Adams E.W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Comrie B. (1986). Conditionals: A typology. In E.C. Traugott, A. Meulen, J.S. Reilly, and C.A. Ferguson (eds.), On Conditionals (pp. 77-99). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crupi V. and Tentori K. (2013). Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 11: 364-372 [Erratum in Journal of Applied Logic, 12 (2014): 230-231].
Douven I. (2015). The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals: Formal and Empirical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iacona A. (2015). Conditionals and negation. Manuscript.
Krzyżanowska K., Wenmackers S., and Douven I. (2013). Inferential conditionals and evidentiality. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 22: 315-334.
Oaksford M. and Chater N. (eds.) (2010). Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
FURTHER WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
Thomas Brouwer
Sam Careelmont
Jade Fletcher
Simon Hewitt
Gail Leckie
Joseph Melia
John Parry
Adam Patel-Summers
Mathieu Rees
Scott Shalkowski
Robbie Williams